"Soft-landing" vs "hard fall" by Hang-Sheng Cheng
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER
January 10, 1986
"Soft-Landing" vs "Hard Fall"
When the u.s. dollar reached dizzying heights last
February in a climb that began in 1980, many were
concerned about its detrimental effects on the u.s.
economy. Since then, the dollar's value has taken a
24 percent fall on a trade-weighted basis against
other major currencies. Some now worry about the
shock of such a "hard fall," and wonder ifa more
gradual, "soft landing" might not be more
beneficial to the u.S. and world economies.
"Soft landing" and "hard fall" are, ofcourse, rela-
tive terms. In this Letter, "soft landing" is defined as
a fall ofabout 5 percent a year, and "hard fall" as a
decline of more than 10 percent a year. To a large
extent, the choice ofthe starting point for a fall
also is arbitrary. For the purpose ofthis Letter, the
benchmark for measuring exchange rate changes is
the average value of the dollar during the fourth
quarter of1984. At that time the dollar's value was
10percent below the February 1985 peak and 6
percent above the average level for the whole of
1984.
Against that benchmark, the dollar had fallen about
5 percenton a trade-weighted basis against other
major currencies by September 20. This drop trans-
lates to an annual 6.7 percent depreciation rate,
which exceeds only moderately our definition of a
"soft landing." September 20 was the eve ofa
meeting of the Group of Five finance ministers and
central bank governors ~ representing France,
West Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States - at which the nations agreed
to start coordinated interventions in the exchange
market (See this Letter, December 13, 1985). Since
then, the dollar has fallen further, such that by late
December, it was 15 percent below the fourth
quarter, 1984 benchmark. This depreciation rate
qualifies as a "hard fall."
This Letterexplores the reasons behind the dis-
satisfaction with a "soft landing" ofthe dollarand
the more recent concerns over the effects of a
"hard faiL" The analysis indicates that it is notthe
"razor's edge" situation suggested by popular con-
cerns. Although a"hard fall" is shown to be clearly
preferable, the analysis does not support a
deliberately expansionary monetary policy for
accelerating the dollar's decline.
Soft landing
Simply stated, dissatisfaction with a"soft landing"
of the dollar stemmed from aconcern that it would
not produce sufficiently rapid economic adjust-
ments to reduce the U.S. trade deficit. From $36
billion in 1980, the deficit increased sharply to
$123 billion in 1984and deteriorated still further in
1985. A major factor behind the deterioration has
been the steady dollar appreciation from 1980 to
February 1985, with several particularly disturbing
potential consequences.
First, there is concern that unless the dollar falls
rapidly, the United States will soon become the
largest debtor nation the world has ever seen.
Assuming an annual dollar depreciation rate of 4 or
5 percent, estimates suggest that itwould take ten
to fourteen years to eliminate the U.S. trade deficit,
resulting in a cumulative increase ofu.s. net
foreign debt amounting to $1.5-2.3 trillion by the
year 2000. It is doubtful ifforeigners would be will-
ing to accumulate such a large amount of dollar
assets in their portfolios; and, even if they were,
there is some question as to whether itwould be in
the u.s. interest to carry such a heavy foreign debt
burden into the future.
Second, the large and growing trade deficit has
imposed a highly uneven distribution of the
burden among the industrial sectors of the national
economy. It has taken a particularly heavy toll on
agriculture, forestry products, mining, and a wide
spectrum of manufacturing industries that are de-
pendent on overseas markets or that compete
actively with imports.
Third, a more immediate threat has been a rising
tide of protectionism in the United States,
manifested in the numerous bills in Congress that
would erect trade barriers on a wide spectrum of
commodity imports. The bills, ifenacted, would
incur the risk of worldwide retaliation against U.S.
exports, as occurred in the 1930s. By the time of
the Group of Five meeting in September this year,
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it had become clear that nothing short of a rapid
fall ofthe dollar could stem the protectionist tide
and avert the threat of adisastrous trade war.
Hard fall
As stated, the dollar's depreciation in 1985 has
qualified as a "hard fall". Should we worry about its
consequences?
One fear has been that a "hard fall" of the dollar
might cause investors to lose confidence in the
dollar and withdraw from dollar assets. A massive
withdrawal from dollar assets might result in a
sharp rise in U.S. interest rates, which, in turn, might
reduce investment and consumer demands and
possibly precipitate aU.s. recession.
So far, fear ofsuch a sequence ofevents has not
been justified. Had there been a massive loss of
confidence in the U.S. dollar, the dollar deprecia-
tion would have been accompanied by a rise in
U.s. interest rates as investors demanded higher
premia for retaining dollar assets. In fact, U.S.
interest rates have declinedin 1985 both
absolutely and in relation to interest rates in major
foreign countries.
Nevertheless, the concern over the potential
effects of a loss ofconfidence in the dollar needs
to be addressed. The absence of such a loss of con-
fidence thus far does not preclude its future occur-
rence. Should it come about, would the resultant
rise in interest rates cause a serious decline in U.s.
aggregate demand?
Aggregate demand
The answer must depend in part on how far
interest rates would rise. A loss ofconfidence in
the dollar may be viewed as an increase in the risk
premia for holding dollar assets. However, it is
wrong to think that U.S. interest rates must rise
fully to offset the increase in risk premia. To the
extentthat the fund withdrawal does not reflect a
change in fundamental market conditions, the con-
comitant dollar depreciation renders foreign cur-
rency assets more expensive in U.S. dollars and,
hence, less attractive to acquire. Moreover, insofar
as dollar assets are viewed by a sufficiently large
group of investors as close substitutes for foreign
currency assets, a small rise in U.s. interest rates
should sufficeto induce investors to retain dollar
assets.
In short, a fund withdrawal creates in its own pro-
cess two price adjustments: a rise in U.S. interest
rates and a fall in the exchange value of the dollar,
both of which work to reduce the incentive to shift
out ofdollar assets. In general, the larger the dollar
depreciation, the smaller U.S. interest rates would
need to rise.
In view of the huge size of the world dollar asset
market relative to that of the dollar exchange
market, it seems that, for agiven amountof fund
withdrawal, u.s. interest rates would rise relatively
little, whereas the exchange value of the dollar
would depreciate a lot. In other words, one might
expect that most of the shock ofan intended fund
withdrawal would be absorbed by dollar deprecia-
tions and relatively little by increases in U.s.
interest rates.
How U.s. aggregate demand would be affected
also depends on the magnitude of the expansion-
ary effects of dollar depreciations relative to that of
the opposing impact of interest rate rises. Eco-
nomic theory suggests that given a high degree of
capital mobility, which is apparently the case for
the United States, the expansionary effects of dol-
lar depreciations following acapital outflow would
tend to dominate the contractionary impactof
higher interest rates. The net effect, therefore,
should be a rise, not a fall, in U.s. aggregate
demand. Model simulations have tended to sup-
port this view. Thus, on both theoretical and
empirical grounds, there is little reason to believe
that a loss of confidence in the dollar would lead to
a serious decline in U.s. aggregate demand.
Inflationary impact
The second concern over a "hard fall" of the dollar
has to do with its potential impacton domestic
inflation. The large dollar depreciation in 1985 is
likely to raise the u.s. prices of imports and,
indirectly, the prices of u.s. goods that compete
with imports in 1986 and beyond. Howlarge and
how longlasting the total effect on the u.s. price
level will be is an empirical question. A recent
study suggests that a10 percent dollar deprecia-
tion in 1985 would raise the u.s. consumer price
inflation rate by 0.7 percentage points in 1986, by
an additional 0.3 percentage points in 1987, and
have no impact from 1988 on.
On the basis of these estimates, the 15 percent de-
,preciation in 1985 might raise the inflation rate by
afull percentage point in 1986, an additional 0.5
percentage points in 1987, but no further after-
wards. Thus, without monetary accommodation,
the total effect of the dollar's "hard fall" in 1985
would be some stepwise increase in the U.S.
domestic price level over the next two years, but
not a continuing surge of inflationary pressure.
Another recent study finds that the impact of
exchange rate changes on the domestic inflation
rate depends critically on how foreign exporters
react to the exchange rate changes, which, in turn,
depends on U.s. domestic aggregate demand con-
ditions. For instance, during the vigorous U.s. eco-
nomic recovery in 1982-84, when u.s. import
demand was extraordinarily strong, foreign export-
ers were able to enlarge their profit margins by rais-
ing their export prices, thus completely offsetting
any disinflationary effect the strong dollar
appreciation had on the U.s. price level.
This experience suggests that considerable profit
margins now exist for foreign exporters to absorb
any adverse impact of dollar depreciations by
reducing their export prices - unless U.s. eco-
nomic growth will be exceptionally strong in 1986.
Barring that event, the inflationary effect of the
dollar's "hard fall" in 1985 can be expected to be
even more modest than is currently estimated.
World growth
A third concern with the dollar's "hard fall"
involves its impact on world economic growth. A
reduction in the u.s. trade deficit would mean a
corresponding reduction in the rest of the world's
trade surpluses. Of particular concern is the impact
on debtordeveloping nations, which have been
especially dependenton large trade surpluses with
the United States to service external debts.
However, the grounds for concern in this area
appear questionable. The dollar's "hard fall" has
been measured against the currencies ofthe other
major industrial countries, notagainst those of the
developing countries. The latter could, and indeed
did, depreciate their currencies either along with
the dollar oreven against the dollar in order to
maintain or improve their trade competitiveness.
The other industrial countries, in contrast, could
compensate for the declines in their exports to the
United States by adopting expansionary
macroeconomic policies for stimulating domestic
demand. The world economy would, in any case,
be better off with more balanced economic
growth among the industrial countries.
Conclusion
By the criteria used in this Letter, the dollar has
taken a "hard fall" during 1985. This development
is to be welcomed because an alternative "soft
landing" would have meant the continued rapid
accumulation of u.s. external debt, an unaccepta-
bly heavy toll on those sectors that are highly sen-
sitive to foreign competition, and the serious risk of
igniting a devastating resurgence of trade protec-
tionism in the world economy.
Furthermore, concerns over the potential impactof
the dollar's "hard fall" appear to be unwarranted at
this juncture. Thus far, there is no evidence that the
dollar's depreciation has led to a massive with-
drawal of funds from dollar assets. Even if this
should happen in the future, the expansionary
effects of the ensuing dollar depreciation on U.S.
aggregate demand are likely to more than offset
the contractionary effects of interest rate rises. In
addition, foreign authorities can compensate for
any adverse effects on the world economy caused
by the dollar's "hard faiL" Finally, the inflationary
impact next year of the "hard fall" is also expected
to be modest, unless fueled by an overly accom-
modative monetary policy or excessively vigorous
domestic economic expansion.
The last consideration suggests that although
further "hard falls" of the dollar need not cause
undue concern, adeliberately expansionary mone-
tary policy to bring it about would be unwarranted.
In contrast, if further "hard falls" result from shrink-
ing U.s. budget deficits and declining U.s. interest
rates relative to those abroad, the outcome should
be felicitous from the viewpoint ofcorrecting the
u.s. trade imbalance and reducing the strains on
the world economic and financial system - even
at the cost of some temporary rises in the domestic
price level.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 199,468 1,586 11;064 5.8
Loans and Leases1 6 181,116 1,359 10,979 6.4
Commercial and Industrial 51,937 475 - 1,062 - 2.0
Real estate 66,062 153 4,143 6.6
Loans to Individuals 38,334 180 6,642 20.9
Leases 5,485 73 406 7.9
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,740 15 - 618 - 5.4
Other Securities2 7,612 212 704 10.1
Total Deposits 202,708 - 276 8,280 4.2
Demand Deposits 51,027 282 4,719 10.1
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 33,762 - 578 4,201 14.2
OtherTransaction Balances4 14,572 - 113 1,934 15.3
Total No'n-Transaction Balances6 137,109 - 445 1,626 1.2
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 45,888 - 15 4,768 11.5
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 37,794 - 328 - 3,331 - 8:0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,433 2,662 3,973 17.6
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.5. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange
t